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WRAPPING THEMSELVES IN THE AMERICAN FLAG1: THE ALIEN 
TORT STATUTE, PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, AND U.S. 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
A first-year student in South Asian studies asked the President: 
My question is in regards to private military contractors.  The Uniform Code of 
Military Justice does not apply to these contractors in Iraq.  I asked your 
Secretary of Defense a couple months ago what law governs their actions. . . . 
  The President. I was going to ask him.  Go ahead.  [Laughter]  Help.  
[Laughter] 
  Q. I was hoping your answer might be a little more specific.  [Laughter] 
Mr. Rumsfeld answered that Iraq has its own domestic laws which he assumed 
applied to those private military contractors.  However, Iraq is clearly not 
currently capable of enforcing its laws, much less against—over our American 
military contractors.  I would submit to you that in this case, this is one case 
that privatization is not a solution.  And, Mr. President, how do you propose to 
bring private military contractors under a system of law? 
  The President. Yes, I appreciate that very much.  I wasn’t kidding—
[laughter].  I was going to—I pick up the phone and say, “Mr. Secretary, I’ve 
got an interesting question.”  [Laughter]  This is what delegation—I don’t 
mean to be dodging the question, although it’s kind of convenient in this case, 
but never—[laughter].  I really will—I’m going to call the Secretary and say 
you brought up a very valid question, and what are we doing about it?  That’s 
how I work.  I’m—thanks.  [Laughter]2 
 
 1. The title comes from a comment made by Judge Donald Stephens during a pretrial 
hearing in a recent case involving Blackwater U.S.A.  See Brian Bennett, Outsourcing the War.  
Four Families Want to Know How Their Men, All Guns for Hire, Died in Iraq, TIME, Mar. 26, 
2007, at 40.  In this case, Blackwater attempted to use U.S. sovereign immunity, saying that they 
“could no more be sued than the U.S. Army could for something that happened in a war zone.”  
Id.  Judge Stephens responded that “Blackwater Security Consulting LLC is not the United States 
Government.”  Id. 
 2. Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies and a Question-
and-Answer Session, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 671, 677–78 (Apr. 10, 2006). 
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On December 24, 2006, Raheem Khalif was working at Prime Minister 
Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s compound in the Green Zone in Iraq as a body guard 
to Vice President Adil Abdul Mahdi.3  Andrew J. Moonen, an off-duty 
Blackwater U.S.A. (Blackwater) employee, was in the Green Zone for a party.4  
Moonen, who had been drinking heavily, was stopped by Khalif and others as 
he tried to pass through the gate to the Prime Minister’s compound.5  During 
the confrontation, Moonen shot Khalif three times.6  Khalif died as a result.7  
As of the writing of this Comment, no charges have been filed.8 
Batoul Mohammed Ali Hussein, a clerk in the Iraqi government, came to 
Baghdad for the day on September 9, 2007 to drop off paperwork near the 
Green Zone.9  Ms. Hussein exited a building at the same time a convoy 
guarded by Blackwater security entered the intersection in front of the 
building.10  In order to clear the way, Blackwater employees yelled at 
construction workers to vacate the intersection.11  When the workers threw 
rocks, the Blackwater employees opened fire, hitting Ms. Hussein.12  
According to eyewitness accounts, Ms. Hussein initially sustained only an 
 
 3. Eric Schmitt, Report Details Shooting by Drunken Blackwater Worker, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
2, 2007, at A10. 
 4. Id.; John M. Broder, Ex-Paratrooper Is Suspect in Drunken Killing of Iraqi, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 4, 2007, at A10.  Blackwater is one of several private military contractors working in Iraq.  
Renae Merle, Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2006, at D1. 
 5. Broder, supra note 4; Schmitt, supra note 3. 
 6. See Schmitt, supra note 3. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Broder, supra note 4.  There is, however, an FBI investigation into the matter.  Id.  Also, 
the Iraqi government publicly declared that Blackwater is banned from operating in Iraq, Joshua 
Partlow & Walter Pincus, Iraq Bans Security Contractor, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2007, at A1, and 
it asked that Blackwater be required to pay $8 million dollars to the families of each person for 
whose death the contractor was responsible.  Christian Berthelsen & Said Rifai, The Brave 
Cabbie of Baghdad: Marani Oranis Drove the Perilous Streets to Support Her Daughters, Until 
She Was Shot to Death by Private Guards, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A1. 
 9. Leila Fadel, 8 Deadly Days for Blackwater: 43 Shot, 16 Killed, as U.S. Touted Iraq 
Progress, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 30, 2007, at A26, available at 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/stories/DN-blackwaterrecap_30int.A 
RT.State.Edition1.420b95f.html.  Coincidentally, Ms. Hussein arrived in the Green Zone the day 
before the United States government, in the persons of General David Petraeus and U.S. 
Ambassador Ryan Crocker, testified to Congress that things were getting better in Iraq.  Iraq 
Benchmarks: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 110th Cong. 173–74, 197 (2007) 
(statements of Gen. David H. Petraeus, former Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, and 
Ryan C. Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq); Fadel, supra.  Later that week, President Bush gave 
a television address in which he claimed “ordinary life is beginning to return.”  Address to the 
Nation on the War on Terror in Iraq, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1204, 1206 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
 10. Fadel, supra note 9. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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injury to her leg.13  However, when she collected herself and began to move 
away, she was shot multiple times and died as a result.14 
On September 16, 2007, Afrah Sattar was on a bus with her mother 
traveling to Baghdad to obtain documentation for an upcoming religious 
pilgrimage.15  As the bus entered the intersection, Ms. Sattar observed 
Blackwater guards firing on a white car.16 Blackwater employees shot and 
killed all of the white car’s occupants, including Dr. Mushin and her family.17  
She and her son were shot and then possibly burned alive when the white car 
exploded.18  Ms. Sattar watched as the Blackwater employees turned their 
attention from the car, approached the bus in which she was traveling, and 
opened fire, killing her mother with a bullet to the head.19  The shootout 
between Blackwater and Iraqi civilians left at least eleven Iraqis dead.20  
Blackwater’s only response at the time was that the victims were not civilians 
and that the attack was not unprovoked.21 
Raheem Khalif, Batoul Mohammed Ali Hussein, Dr. Mushin, and Afrah 
Sattar’s mother represent just four deaths resulting from the estimated 195 
“escalation of force” incidents involving Blackwater alone.22  Although 
Blackwater is one of several companies providing private military contractors 
(PMCs) in Iraq,23 and estimates place the total number of contractors there at 
over 160,000,24 Blackwater has a far higher rate of shootings than its primary 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Fadel, supra note 9. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Aamer Madhani, House: No Pass for Contractors, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 2007, at 1.  
Reports vary and eleven is at the low end of the estimates.  See id.; Berthelsen & Rifai, supra note 
8; Blackwater USA Is Sued by Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, at A10. 
 21. Fadel, supra note 9. 
 22. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 110TH CONG., 
MEMORANDUM REGARDING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT BLACKWATER USA 1 (Comm. 
Print 2007). 
 23. Merle, supra note 4. 
 24. P.W. Singer, Can’t Win With ‘Em, Can’t Go to War Without ‘Em: Private Military 
Contractors and Counterinsurgency, Policy Paper No. 4 BROOKINGS  2 (2007) [hereinafter 
Singer, Can’t Win With ‘Em].  Singer says that in 2006, the U.S. Central Command estimated the 
number to be around 100,000, which researchers have referred to as a “WAG,” short for “wild ass 
guess.”  Id.  He also claims that an internal Department of Defense census on the private 
contractor industry found almost 180,000 private contractors in Iraq.  Id.  Even this number is 
thought to be low given the fact that “a number of the biggest companies, as well as any firms 
employed by the Department of State or other agencies or NGOs, were not included in the 
census.”  Id. 
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competitor in the field.25  Just how many Iraqi civilians have been wounded or 
killed by PMCs remains undetermined, in large part because the number of 
contractors rivals that of U.S. troops in Iraq, leading Iraqis to confuse 
contractors with U.S. military.26  More importantly, there seems to be no clear 
avenue through which a victim of such an attack could redress her injuries.  If 
the perpetrator were U.S. military, that soldier would be subject to prosecution 
for actions in Iraq under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).27 
PMCs, however, seem to exist in a space that is outside the law.  They are 
immune from prosecution under Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) law,28 
and the military rarely court-martials civilians.29  Further, there has been a 
paucity of PMC prosecutions for their actions in Iraq.30  When Moonen killed 
Khalif last Christmas Eve, the State Department suggested that Blackwater pay 
off the family and negotiated a sum on its behalf.31  The State Department then 
arranged Moonen’s hasty departure,32 and Blackwater billed him for his ticket 
home.33  In a congressional hearing on October 2, 2007, U.S. Representative 
 
 25. James Risen, State Dept. Tallies 56 Shootings Involving Blackwater on Diplomatic 
Guard Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at A12. 
 26. See Singer, Can’t Win With ‘Em, supra note 24, at 2, 5–6, 9.  Also, according to the 
Department of Defense, the United States does not keep statistics on casualties involving Iraqis.  
See P.W. Singer, Outsourcing War, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 119, 122 (2005) [hereinafter Singer, 
Outsourcing War]. 
 27. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006); see Heather Carney, Note, Prosecuting the Lawless: 
Human Rights Abuses and Private Military Firms, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 329, 331 (2006). 
 28. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised), Status of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, MNF-Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq § 4 (June 27, 2004), 
available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/ (follow “Order 17” hyperlink); see also Carney, 
supra note 27, at 330. 
 29. See Carney, supra note 27, at 331 & n.137; David M. Herszenhorn, House’s Iraq Bill 
Applies U.S. Law to Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, at A1 (explaining that although 
Congress recently amended the UCMJ to potentially subject PMCs to court-martial, no 
prosecutions had occurred under that provision). 
 30. Jonathan Finer, Holstering the Hired Guns: New Accountability Measures for Private 
Security Contractors, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 259, 260 (2008); See also Katherine Jackson, 
Comment, Not Quite a Civilian, Not Quite a Soldier: How Five Words Could Subject Civilian 
Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to Military Jurisdiction, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDICIARY 255, 260–61 (2007) (“To date, one civilian contractor has been prosecuted for crimes 
committed abroad and none have been prosecuted for crimes committed in Iraq.”); Herszenhorn, 
supra note 29 (noting that only two criminal cases involving contractors have originated in Iraq 
since 2000). 
 31. See Hearing on Blackwater USA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Blackwater Hearing] (statement of Rep. Henry 
Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform) (transcript on file with author); 
Broder, supra note 4. 
 32. Warren P. Strobel, U.S. Aided Blackwater in Aftermath of Killings, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Oct. 2, 2007, at 1 (referencing Blackwater Hearing, supra note 31). 
 33. Broder, supra note 4; Jeremy Scahill, Blackwatergate, NATION, Oct. 22, 2007, at 4. 
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Carolyn Maloney said about Moonen: “If he lived in America, he would have 
been arrested, and he would be facing criminal charges. . . . But it appears to 
me that Blackwater has special rules.”34  Blackwater founder Erik Prince later 
asserted: “[W]e . . . can’t do any more.  We can’t flog him.  We can’t 
incarcerate him.”35 
And what of Blackwater itself?  Does Blackwater suffer any 
consequences?  Are PMCs in general held accountable by their employer, the 
U.S. government?  After the September killings, Blackwater was briefly 
banned by the Iraqi government and asked to pay $8 million in damages for 
each victim.36  However, Condoleezza Rice’s calls to Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki to express regret for the killings and her promises to change State 
Department policy regarding PMCs persuaded the Iraqi government to 
reinstate Blackwater’s contract.37  In sum, PMCs seem to operate in a twilight 
zone where accountability and oversight have given way to profit, efficiency, 
and political expediency.  The problem of PMC accountability and oversight is 
increasingly important as our government considers expanding its role in Iraq 
and expanding the “war on terror” to Iran. 
This Comment addresses two related problems: (1) How can PMCs be held 
accountable for the criminal and tortious acts they commit abroad while under 
the employ of the U.S. government? (2) How can victims of PMC actions 
abroad seek justice and be compensated? 
The first step in answering these questions is to determine whether it is 
better to use the tools of criminal law or the tools of tort law, or a combination 
of both, to regulate the conduct of PMCs doing business on behalf of the U.S. 
government.  In Part I, this Comment will briefly explain the history of PMCs 
in the U.S. military and describe the need for some regulatory mechanisms for 
them.  Part II will examine criminal law as a possible mechanism for 
regulating PMCs in the form of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
(MEJA).38  Part III will discuss tort law as a possible regulating mechanism in 
the form of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),39 pointing out the ATS’s limits as 
shown in several recent cases.  Part IV will offer solutions to the state actor 
requirement, one of the major obstacles to using the ATS to regulate PMCs.  
Finally, it is the author’s hope that the use of the ATS to regulate private 
 
 34. Blackwater Hearing, supra note 31 (statement of Rep. Carolyn Maloney, Member, H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform). 
 35. Id. at 70–71 (testimony of Erik Prince, Chairman and CEO of Blackwater). 
 36. Berthelsen & Rifai, supra note 8; Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Contractor Banned by Iraq 
over Shootings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at A1. 
 37. Maj. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Drowning in Blackwater: How Weak Accountability over 
Private Security Contractors Significantly Undermines Counterinsurgency Efforts, ARMY LAW., 
July 2008, at 64, 83. 
 38. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267 (2006). 
 39. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
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military contractors will benefit the United States as much as it will the victims 
of PMC abuses.  This product of the Founders’ generation can improve foreign 
relations by opening our courts to foreign victims of crimes committed by U.S. 
companies. 
I.  PMCS IN THE U.S. MILITARY: CAN’T WIN WITH ‘EM, CAN’T GO TO WAR 
WITHOUT ‘EM40 
A. The Rise of the PMC 
  The topic today is an adversary that poses a threat, a serious threat, to the 
security of the United States of America . . . .  This adversary is one of the 
world’s last bastions of central planning.  It governs by dictating five-year 
plans.  From a single capital, it attempts to impose its demands across time 
zones, continents, oceans, and beyond.  With brutal consistency, it stifles free 
thought and crushes new ideas.  It disrupts the defense of the United States and 
places the lives of men and women in uniform at risk. . . . Perhaps this 
adversary sounds like the former Soviet Union, but that enemy is gone: our 
foes are more subtle and implacable today.  You may think I’m describing one 
of the last decrepit dictators of the world.  But their day, too, is almost past, 
and they cannot match the strength and size of this adversary.  The adversary’s 
closer to home.  It’s the Pentagon bureaucracy. . . . [U]nlike businesses, 
governments can’t die, so we need to find other incentives for bureaucracy to 
adapt and improve. . . . Some might ask, How in the world could the Secretary 
of Defense attack the Pentagon in front of its people? . . . To them I reply, I 
have no desire to attack the Pentagon; I want to liberate it.  We need to save it 
from itself.41 
This is how Donald Rumsfeld opened one of his first speeches as Defense 
Secretary to a group of former corporate executives on September 10, 2001.42  
He then pinpointed his Department of Defense’s (DOD) top priority: “a 
wholesale shift in the running of the Pentagon, supplanting the old DoD 
bureaucracy with a new model, one based on the private sector.”43  Figuring 
prominently in Rumsfeld’s solution was an increase in the use of PMCs.44 
 
 40. Singer, Can’t Win With ‘Em, supra note 24. 
 41. JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL 
MERCENARY ARMY 50 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Donald H. Rumsfeld, 
U.S. Sec’y of Def., Remarks at the DOD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week Kickoff: 
Bureaucracy to Battlefield (Sept. 10, 2001), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/ 
speech.aspx?speechid=430). 
 42. Id. at 49–50. 
 43. Id. at 50. 
 44. Christopher Cooper, Iraq Reconstruction Work Picks Up Pace Again, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
16, 2004, at A2. 
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PMCs are “businesses that provide governments with professional services 
intricately linked to warfare; they represent, in other words, the corporate 
evolution of the age-old profession of mercenaries.”45  PMCs are a $300 billion 
industry, with operations all over the world.46  They provide a variety of 
services for which the government would otherwise have to pay soldiers.  For 
example, PMCs handle logistics, train local armies, and fight alongside 
American troops.47  Thus, proponents claim they save money and increase 
efficiency while also offering cover to politicians sending troops to war.48  At 
first glance it may seem counterintuitive that PMCs save the government 
money because the private solider earns substantially more than the average 
enlisted man.49  However, proponents argue that the difference narrows when 
training, benefits, and equipment are included in the equation.50  Regarding the 
political benefits, when the government sends private fighters to obscure 
nations, and they are killed in combat, neither the fact that they were hired nor 
the fact that they died is likely to get mentioned in the media.51  Further, PMCs 
reduce the need for reserve call-ups and help politically undesirable conflicts 
maintain a relatively low profile.52 
While the use of mercenaries is not new,53 the combination of the end of 
the Cold War and a general move toward privatization in the 1990s led to a 
 
 45. Singer, Outsourcing War, supra note 26, at 120. 
 46. Id. at 119, 131; Ryan P. Logan, Note, The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005: Embodying 
U.S. Values to Eliminate Detainee Abuse by Civilian Contractors and Bounty Hunters in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1605, 1610 (2006). 
 47. Singer, Outsourcing War, supra note 26, at 122–23. 
 48. Carney, supra note 27, at 323; Jackson, supra note 30, at 259–62; Singer, Can’t Win 
With ‘Em, supra note 24, at 3–4. 
 49. Singer, Outsourcing War, supra note 26, at 129 (estimating that private soldiers make 
between two and ten times more than their counterparts). 
 50. See Jackson, supra note 30, at 261. 
 51. Id. at 261–62; P.W. Singer, Warriors for Hire in Iraq, SALON.COM, Apr. 15, 2004, 
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2004/04/15/warriors/index.html [hereinafter Singer, 
Warriors for Hire].  Singer also notes that PMC casualties are not reported, unlike U.S. military 
casualties, contributing to the sense that PMC deaths are not covered in the news.  Id.; Singer, 
Outsourcing War, supra note 26, at 126.  An informal survey led Singer to conclude that 200–300 
private soldiers had died through April 2004, which “is more than the entire 82nd Airborne 
Division lost in Iraq over the past year.”  Singer, Warriors for Hire, supra. 
 52. Singer, Warriors for Hire, supra note 51. 
 53. The history of private citizens working for the U.S. government in war dates back to 
George Washington, Logan, supra note 46, at 1609, and their rise in prominence dates to the 
Vietnam War, the end of the draft, and the beginning of the all-volunteer force, Singer, Can’t Win 
With ‘Em, supra note 24, at 2.  Despite Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams’s 
attempts to ensure “that the military would not go to war without sufficient backing and 
involvement of the nation,” war support was increasingly in the hands of private contractors 
instead of soldiers.  Id. 
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significant rise in prominence of the PMC.54  The ready availability of soldiers 
from downsized armies and the instability resulting from the end of the Cold 
War added fuel to the fire.55  These highly trained soldiers, now unemployed, 
found jobs at PMCs, destabilizing “the governmental monopoly on the ability 
to make war and maintain sovereignty” and presenting “an opportunity for 
companies to offer experienced personnel and military services to the highest 
bidder.”56  From Sierra Leone to the conflict between the Bosnians and Serbs, 
PMCs were there.57  When the Philippines needed help in its fight with Islamic 
Guerillas, DynCorp worked on logistics; in Colombia, DynCorp worked on 
anti-narcotics and counter-guerilla operations.58  When the United States 
helped train the former Soviet Republic of Georgia to fight Muslim terrorists, 
PMCs were there.59 
B. PMCs in Iraq 
Simply put, “the war in Iraq would not be possible without [PMCs].”60  
While the end of the Cold War in the 1990s sparked tremendous growth in the 
industry, September 11th and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq 
established PMCs as a crucial element of the war effort.61  During the invasion 
and occupation of Iraq under Secretary Rumsfeld’s leadership, “private 
military employees handled everything from feeding and housing U.S. troops 
to maintaining sophisticated weapons systems like the B-2 stealth bomber, F-
117 stealth fighter, Global Hawk UAV, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, M-1 
Tank, Apache helicopter, and air defense systems.”62  Secretary Rumsfeld’s 
edict about the privatization of the DOD translated to “more than half of its 
civilian workforceas well as 58,727 military positions” being filled by 
 
 54. Singer, Outsourcing War, supra note 26, at 120. 
 55. Id.  Singer is careful to distinguish between different types of PMCs, stating: 
The PM[C]s . . . are not all alike, nor do they all offer the exact same services.  The 
industry is divided into three basic sectors: military provider firms (also known as 
“private security firms”), which offer tactical military assistance, including actual combat 
services, to clients; military consulting firms, which employ retired officers to provide 
strategic advice and military training; and military support firms, which provide logistics, 
intelligence, and maintenance services to armed forces, allowing the latter’s soldiers to 
concentrate on combat and reducing their government’s need to recruit more troops or call 
up more reserves. 
Id. at 120–21. 
 56. Jackson, supra note 30, at 259. 
 57. P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY 
INDUSTRY 3–5 (2003). 
 58. Singer, Warriors for Hire, supra note 51. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Singer, Can’t Win With ‘Em, supra note 24, at 3. 
 61. See Singer, Warriors for Hire, supra note 51. 
 62. Id. 
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contractors.63  It is estimated that “one out of every ten” soldiers working in 
Iraq is a PMC employee.64  One-third of the monthly cost of the war in Iraq is 
paid to PMCs.65  KBR Halliburton built the prisons at Guantanamo Bay.66  
Titan Corp. and CACI translated for and interrogated the prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib.67 
This wholesale replacement of military personnel with private soldiers was 
unprecedented in our nation’s history.68  Further, privatization created 
problems with which the United States was not ready to deal.69 
C. PMC Abuse at Abu Ghraib 
Although there are numerous examples of the problems that PMCs cause 
the United States, the most prominent came to light at Abu Ghraib.  Most 
Americans know of Lynndie England’s role in the humiliation of Iraqi 
prisoners,70 but few people know the role PMCs played in those same abuses at 
Abu Ghraib.  Reports show that CACI made up over half of all analysts and 
interrogators there, while the translators who facilitated the communications 
between interrogators, prisoners, and guards were employed by Titan.71  
Further, contractors were implicated in the rape of a teenage boy.72  A witness 
claimed that Adel Nakhla, an employee of Titan Corp., raped the young boy.73  
CACI employee Steven Stephanowicz is alleged to have told military 
personnel to physically abuse prisoners before interrogations.74  In addition, 
Stephanowicz lied about where he was, how the interrogations happened, and 
his “knowledge of abuse.”75 
 
 63. See Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges 
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1003 (2005). 
 64. Carney, supra note 27, at 327. 
 65. Id.  Carney points out that individual salaries at PMCs range from “$100,000 to 
$200,000” and that former soldiers can earn “$1000 a day,” in contrast to the range of “$1193 to 
upwards of $5054 a month” that an enlisted military member can make.  Id. at 327–28. 
 66. Singer, Warriors for Hire, supra note 51. 
 67. Carney, supra note 27, at 328–29. 
 68. See Singer, Warriors for Hire, supra note 51. 
 69. See Minow, supra note 63, at 1004–05. 
 70. Laurie Goodstein, A Soldier Hoped to Do Good, but Was Changed by War, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 13, 2006, at A16. 
 71. Carney, supra note 27, at 328–29. 
 72. Jackson, supra note 30, at 263. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Carney, supra note 27, at 329. 
 75. Id. 
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D. Oversight and Regulation: PMCs Fall Between the Cracks 
The Abu Ghraib scandal exemplified the problems created by the 
interrelationship of private contractors and the U.S. military.  According to 
reports, it is unclear whether the military was in charge of the PMCs or the 
PMCs were in charge of the military.76  Military forces claimed to be “unaware 
of the civilian status of individuals or that the contractors refused to take 
commands.”77  One report on the incident claimed that private contractors 
pressured the military and that “[t]here was little actual supervision of the 
contractors in the field.”78 
Thus, in addition to the horror of the rape, sodomy, and general abuse that 
Abu Ghraib revealed, the United States was faced with the question of how to 
punish the abusers.  For the military personnel, the method was clear; they 
were court-martialed and faced conviction.79  However, the PMC employees 
were in a different category.80  The CPA in Iraq placed the responsibility for 
disciplining contractors with the contractors.81  Further, the CPA “exempted 
contractors from Iraqi law for matters relating to their contracts,” allowing that 
employees would be “subject to the laws of their home countries.”82 
As a result, neither Stephanowicz nor Nakhla have been criminally 
prosecuted.83  Prosecutors claimed that locating witnesses impeded the 
prosecution of Nakhla.84  In addition, the CPA was disinclined to aid in 
investigations.85  Finally, the Department of Justice seems to lack the will to 
pursue criminal prosecutions of private contractors.86  However, Titan Corp. 
and CACI have faced civil lawsuits because of their participation in the abuses 
at Abu Ghraib.87 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Carney, supra note 27, at 329. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. at 328; see Singer, Can’t Win With ‘Em, supra note 24, at 11–12. 
 82. Carney, supra note 27, at 330 (citing Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 
(revised), supra note 28, at § 4). 
 83. See Jackson, supra note 30, at 263–64. 
 84. Id. at 263. 
 85. See id. at 263–64; supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Carney, supra note 27, at 332 (stating that “the U.S. Justice Department has not said 
publicly whether or how it will employ the law” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jackson, 
supra note 30, at 257 (arguing that obstacles cited by “[i]nvestigators and potential prosecutors” 
as prohibiting criminal prosecution of contractors were not obstacles for military courts 
prosecuting military personnel for the same crimes). 
 87. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2006); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 
F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005).  See generally Jackson, supra note 30, at 264 (“[V]ictims of these 
alleged crimes have had to resort to the civil legal system to be made whole by monetary 
means.”). 
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E. PMCs Are Not Going Away: The Need for Accountability and Oversight 
Opinions differ on the role PMCs play and the value they provide the 
United States.  Proponents argue that the use of contractors allows the military 
to focus on fighting military battles, reduce recruiting, increase retention, and 
reduce costs.88  Perhaps most importantly, politicians gain political advantage 
by reducing the impact of the war on the general public.89  Some claim that by 
artificially reducing the number of soldier deaths through the shift of 
responsibility from civilian soldiers to private contractors, the American public 
is misled into believing that the death toll in the conflict is lower than it 
actually is.90  In the end, PMCs are now so fully integrated into the military 
that foreign policy must necessarily include them.  As such, the U.S. 
government must address the crucial issues of oversight and accountability of 
PMCs. 
II.  THE MILITARY EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ACT 
Although there have been several incidents involving PMCs that raised 
questions of accountability and oversight,91 most prominently the 
aforementioned abuses at Abu Ghraib,92 the Blackwater shooting of September 
16, 2007 sparked renewed investigations into the oversight, regulation, and 
liability of PMCs working for the United States abroad.93  After hearings 
conducted by U.S. Representative Henry Waxman regarding Blackwater’s 
activities in Iraq, including testimony from Blackwater’s founder Erik Prince,94 
the House of Representatives acted.95  On October 4, 2007, the House passed 
an expansion of MEJA, attempting to close the loopholes that have allowed 
PMCs to escape prosecution for crimes committed while in Iraq working for 
 
 88. Carney, supra note 27, at 323; Logan, supra note 46, at 1611. 
 89. See Logan, supra note 46, at 1611. 
 90. See, e.g., id. 
 91. See generally Karen DeYoung, Other Killings by Blackwater Staff Detailed: State Dept. 
Papers Tell of Coverup, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2007, at A1 (noting “[t]he State Department made 
little effort to hold Blackwater personnel accountable” for “escalation of force incidents”); T. 
Christian Miller, Private Security Guards in Iraq Operate with Little Supervision, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 4, 2005, at A1 (noting that private security contractors “involved in scores of shootings . . . 
[and] suspected of reckless behavior” were sent home rather than being prosecuted); Craig S. 
Smith, The Intimidating Face of America, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at A4 (noting that U.S. 
allies believe American private security forces “would do well to act a little gentler” because their 
aggressive behavior only serves to “breed resentment among allied soldiers . . . not to speak of 
Afghans”). 
 92. See, e.g., Saleh, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 56; Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 12. 
 93. Madhani, supra note 20. 
 94. Blackwater Hearing, supra note 31; see also Scahill, supra note 33, at 4. 
 95. Jonathan Weisman, House Acts in Wake of Blackwater Incident: Measure Is Passed to 
Place Wartime Contractors Under U.S. Courts’ Jurisdiction, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2007, at A6. 
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the U.S. government.96  Initially passed in 2000 and subsequently expanded 
after revelations of contractor involvement in the Abu Ghraib scandal, the 
House seemingly believed that MEJA could provide a mechanism for the 
oversight and regulation of PMCs in Iraq.97 
The next sections detail how MEJA has evolved over the years in attempts 
by Congress to close its gaps and to find in it a mechanism to hold PMCs 
accountable.  However, we will see that due to a combination of lack of 
enforcement and loose drafting, MEJA remains inadequate as a tool to regulate 
PMCs. 
A. MEJA 200098 
Congress officially extended federal criminal law to civilians working for 
the DOD when it passed the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 
(MEJA 2000).99  MEJA 2000 held certain civilian employees and contractors, 
 
 96. MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. (2007); see 
Weisman, supra note 95. 
 97. See Carney, supra note 27, at 331–32. 
 98. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267 (2000) 
(amended 2004). 
 99. MEJA 2000 reads, in part, as follows: 
§ 3261.  Criminal offenses committed by certain members of the Armed Forces and by 
persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States 
(a) Whoever engages in conduct outside the United States that would constitute an offense 
punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in 
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States 
(1) while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United 
States; or 
(2) while a member of the Armed Forces subject to chapter 47 of title 10 (the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice), 
shall be punished as provided for that offense. 
(b) No prosecution may be commenced against a person under this section if a foreign 
government, in accordance with jurisdiction recognized by the United States, has 
prosecuted or is prosecuting such person for the conduct constituting such offense, except 
upon the approval of the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General (or a person 
acting in either such capacity), which function of approval may not be delegated. 
(c) Nothing in this chapter may be construed to deprive a court-martial, military 
commission, provost court, or other military tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction with 
respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by a 
court-martial, military commission, provost court, or other military tribunal. 
(d) No prosecution may be commenced against a member of the Armed Forces subject to 
chapter 47 of title 10 (the Uniform Code of Military Justice) under this section unless 
(1) such member ceases to be subject to such chapter; or 
(2) an indictment or information charges that the member committed the offense 
with one or more other defendants, at least one of whom is not subject to such 
chapter. 
Id. § 1321. 
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as well as their employees, criminally liable for acts that were a felony under 
U.S. law.100  While not explicitly intended to regulate PMCs, MEJA 2000 did 
apply to those contractors who were hired by the DOD.101  However, MEJA 
2000’s language was vague enough that it did not apply to contractors hired by 
any other governmental department.102  This jurisdictional gap, which the Act 
was intended to close, left out employees of the State Department, the Justice 
Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA).103  Under MEJA 2000, most PMCs were effectively 
unpunishable under U.S. law for crimes committed abroad.104  In the next 
section, this Comment will discuss how Congress sought to address this gap in 
jurisdiction through a revision of MEJA 2000 following PMC abuse at Abu 
Ghraib. 
B. MEJA 2004105 
The events at Abu Ghraib led to a revision of MEJA 2000 in an attempt to 
close the above mentioned jurisdictional gaps.106  Because some of the people 
involved in Abu Ghraib were civilian contractors working for departments 
other than the DOD, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the 
Department of the Interior, they could not be prosecuted under MEJA 2000.107  
To address the gap, Congress passed an Act amending MEJA 2000 “to extend 
its jurisdictional coverage to employees and contractors of other federal 
agencies,” including “employees and contractors of ‘any provisional 
authority.’”108  Unfortunately, jurisdiction was limited to those engaged in 
employment related to the support of a “mission” of the DOD.109  The Act’s 
ambiguity sparked questions about whether its limited jurisdictional extension 
actually closed the gaps in coverage that concerned its drafters.110  Contractors 
could escape liability if their activities did not support a mission of the DOD, 
even if those activities would be illegal if committed in the United States. 
 
 100. Id. § 1321(a); see also Carney, supra note 27, at 331–32; Maj. Glenn R. Schmitt, 
Amending the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Rushing to Close an Unforeseen 
Loophole, 2005 ARMY LAW. 41, 41–42. 
 101. Carney, supra note 27, at 332. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id.; Schmitt, supra note 100, at 42 (suggesting that MEJA 2000 would not cover 
“persons or organizations under contract” with any government agency other than the DOD). 
 104. See Carney, supra note 27, at 332; Schmitt, supra note 100, at 42. 
 105. Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 108-375, sec. 1088, § 3267(1)(a), 118 Stat. 1811, 2066–67 (2004). 
 106. Carney, supra note 27, at 332. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Schmitt, supra note 100, at 43 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(A) (2006) (as amended)). 
 109. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(A)(i)(II). 
 110. See Carney, supra note 27, at 332. 
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C. MEJA 2007?: House Bill 2740: MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 
2007111 
In response to the Blackwater shooting of September 16, 2007, the House 
of Representatives passed House Bill 2740 on October 4, 2007.112  This most 
recent revision of MEJA reflects the House’s desire to address specifically the 
issue of contractor accountability.113  The Bill adds the following language 
after paragraph two of MEJA: 
while employed under a contract (or subcontract at any tier) awarded by any 
department or agency of the United States, where the work under such contract 
is carried out in an area, or in close proximity to an area (as designated by the 
Department of Defense), where the Armed Forces is conducting a contingency 
operation.114 
Significantly, the Bill explicitly includes contractors working under any 
department,115 which indeed addresses some of the above mentioned concerns 
with respect to illegal activity committed abroad while under contract with the 
U.S. government. 
At first glance, this legislation seems to have taken substantive steps 
toward closing the significant jurisdictional gaps in the previous versions of 
MEJA.  However, upon closer inspection, it appears that MEJA 2007 remains 
ambiguous, providing contractors with the room they need to avoid liability.  
MEJA 2007 creates another loophole by leaving “close proximity” undefined 
in the clause “or in close proximity to an area (as designated by the 
Department of Defense).”116  This ambiguity seems to allow for any range of 
interpretations regarding the applicability of the provision. 
Further, no version of MEJA would apply to assaults by striking, beating, 
or wounding, in spite of the fact that such actions are a violation of 
international law when the victim is a prisoner.117  Thus, if a DOD employee or 
contractor beat a prisoner while overseas, he or she would not be subject to 
liability under MEJA.118  These offenses, although clearly punishable through 
 
 111. H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 112. See 110 CONG. REC. H11,214 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2007) (statement of Rep. Conyers).  The 
House and Senate have also introduced other bills in the same vein.  See Transparency and 
Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007, S. 674, 110th Cong. (2007); 
Transparency and Accountability in Security Contracting Act of 2007, H.R. 369, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
 113. See H.R. 2740. 
 114. Id. § 2(a)(1)(C). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Anthony E. Giardino, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Violations of the 
Law of War:  Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L. REV. 699, 732–33 (2007). 
 118. Id. 
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the employer, do not meet MEJA’s requirement that they be punishable by a 
one-year minimum penalty.119 
Finally, while more serious offenses are subject to MEJA, no contractors 
have been prosecuted under it during the “Global War on Terrorism,” 
suggesting “that the Department of Justice lacks the desire and resources 
necessary to pursue such cases.”120 According to some scholars, the key issue 
is “whether Congress provides the resources and the Justice Department takes 
those resources and puts them in the field to conduct these investigations, and 
ultimately brings cases where they’re warranted.”121  In sum, MEJA could 
work if there were adequate will and resources to enforce it.122  However, until 
that moment is reached, criminal prosecution under MEJA cannot address the 
problems raised by PMCs, and victims of PMC abuse will have to seek 
alternative measures to redress their injuries. 
III.  The Alien Tort Statute123 
The families of the victims of the September 16, 2007 shooting sought 
redress of their grievances through civil litigation.  On October 11, 2007, a 
lawsuit was filed in part under the ATS against Blackwater in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging “extrajudicial killing” and 
“war crimes.”124  The Center for Constitutional Rights, Susan Burke, and 
Shereef Akeel represent three families of the victims and a survivor.125  While 
there have been other lawsuits in the past and there are currently other lawsuits 
 
 119. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) (2006); Giardino, supra note 117, at 733. 
 120. Giardino, supra note 117, at 733. 
 121. Marcia Coyle, A Strategy for Blackwater: Three Key Legal Regimes to Rein in Iraq 
Contractors, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 22, 2007, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The article also 
notes that Congress included wording in the 2007 Defense Authorization Act that would make 
“the UCMJ . . . applicable to federal civilian and private contractor employees who closely 
support U.S. armed forces ‘in time of declared war or a contingency operation.’”  Id.  However, 
as the article notes, the DOD views its mission as carrying out “national security initiatives” and 
not going “around prosecuting civilian contractors.  To them, it’s piling on here.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 122. Id.  Coyle quotes an attorney as saying the following: “I think expansion of MEJA is 
good policy for the United States right now . . . . I don’t represent any private security 
contractors.  We know them and they generally favor the idea of having some recognized body of 
law applicable to them.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Further, “[the DOD] got this 
statute a year ago.  It’s not clear to me they ever wanted it.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 123. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 124. Complaint at 11–12, Estate of Atban v. Blackwater USA, No. 1:07-cv-01831-RBW 
(D.D.C. Oct. 11, 2007). 
 125. Democracy Now!: Family Members of Slain Iraqis Sue Blackwater USA for Deadly 
Baghdad Shooting, (Democracy Now! broadcast Oct. 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.democracynow.org/2007/10/11/exclusive_family_members_of_slain_iraqis. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
262 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:247 
pending, “this is the first major case brought by Iraqi civilians against a private 
military company like Blackwater.”126 
A. The Alien Tort Statute127—Background and Development 
The ATS is one of the most promising civil measures that victims of PMC 
abuse can use to redress their injuries.  The ATS states that “[t]he district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”128  Because there is little legislative history regarding the ATS during 
the First Congress, its intended use at the time of its creation remains 
somewhat unclear.129  However, the proceedings of the Continental Congress 
show that one of the major concerns facing the United States that led to the 
adoption of the Constitution, as well as the Judiciary Act of 1789, was lack of 
compliance with treaties on the part of individual states.130  When foreign 
nations argued that a U.S. state had violated a treaty and sought redress of that 
grievance, the United States, under the Continental Congress, had little 
authority to force the state into compliance.131  Not surprisingly, foreign 
nations were skeptical about the United States’ willingness and ability to honor 
treaties.132  When the Judiciary Act was passed, the federal government 
established authority over areas such as diplomacy and ambassadors.133  In this 
light, the ATS can be seen as an important corollary to the Judiciary Act 
because it vested the federal government with jurisdiction over cases that were 
considered most likely to impact international relations and undermine foreign 
confidence in the United States’ compliance with its international obligations. 
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala134 
Before the Filartiga case, the ATS was rarely used and largely ignored in 
the nearly 200 years since its enactment.135  Filartiga involved the kidnapping, 
detention, torture, and resultant death of Joelito Filartiga, and it alleged several 
violations, none of which were treaty-based.136  Because of this, the court 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. The ATS is sometimes referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).  The terms may 
be used interchangeably as they are essentially synonymous. 
 128. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 129. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718–19 (2004). 
 130. Id. at 716–17. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. at 716–17 & n.11. 
 133. Id. at 717. 
 134. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 135. Beth Stephens, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: From Family Tragedy to Human Rights 
Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 623, 625 (2006). 
 136. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878, 880. 
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initially had to determine whether acts of torture violated international law.137  
In order to make this determination, the court looked to “the works of jurists, 
writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of 
nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.”138  The 
court determined “that the law of nations was to be interpreted as constantly 
evolving rather than a static body of law frozen in content at the time of the 
adoption of the ATCA in 1789.”139 
After having determined that torture was a violation of international law 
and hence the law of nations, the court established that international law was a 
part of federal common law.140  As such, ATS did not create new rights but 
rather gave the court the opportunity to adjudicate “rights already recognized 
by international law.”141 
After Filartiga, courts and academics began to explore possible uses of the 
ATS, concluding that it may provide a basis for the enforcement of 
international law in U.S. courts.142 Specifically, non-governmental 
organizations and plaintiffs’ attorneys brought international human rights cases 
into the courts under the ATS, alleging that governments, corporations, and 
individuals could be held liable for violations of international law.143  While 
opinions differed about the credibility of such claims and their chances for 
success, the lawsuits continued to come, albeit slowly.144 
2. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain145 
In 2004, the Supreme Court addressed the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain.146  In 1990, the DEA hired Jose Francisco Sosa and other Mexican 
nationals to kidnap Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez) and bring him back 
to the United States to face charges for the torture and murder of DEA agent 
Enrique Camarena-Salazar.147  Alvarez was eventually acquitted of those 
charges and in 1993 brought suit against Sosa, DEA operative Antonio Garate-
Bustamante, five Mexican civilians, the United States, and four DEA agents.148  
 
 137. Id. at 880. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Lucien J. Dhooge, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Modern Transnational Enterprise:  
Deconstructing the Mythology of Judicial Activism, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 3, 14 (2003) (citing 
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881). 
 140. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884–85. 
 141. Id. at 887. 
 142. See Stephens, supra note 135, at 628. 
 143. Id. at 627 & n.17. 
 144. See id. at 628. 
 145. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 146. Id. at 697. 
 147. Id. at 697–98. 
 148. Id. at 698. 
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Alvarez sought damages from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA)149 and from Sosa under the ATS.150  The district court dismissed 
the FTCA claim but awarded $25,000 in damages on the ATS claim.151  The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the ATS claim, arguing that the ATS “not only provides 
federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction, but also creates a cause of action 
for an alleged violation of the law of nations.”152  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari “to clarify the scope of both the FTCA and the ATS.”153 
Sosa argued, and Justice Souter writing for the Court eventually agreed, 
that Alvarez could claim no relief under the ATS because the statute is 
primarily jurisdictional, granting judicially-created causes of action only in 
limited circumstances.154  Importantly, however, the Court concluded “that at 
the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in a 
very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common 
law.”155  While the Court ruled against Alvarez, its decision leaves open the 
use of the ATS for the prosecution of private military contractors such as 
Blackwater. 
a. The Court’s Historical Analysis in Sosa 
Before turning to Blackwater, however, this Comment will analyze the 
Court’s holding in Sosa, focusing on the role it assigns to the law of nations 
both in the past and today.  The Court defined its historical understanding of 
the law of nations along three lines: (1) as the law that governs relations 
between nation states; (2) as the law that governs individuals outside the 
domestic context; and (3) as the law governing “a sphere in which these rules 
binding individuals for the benefit of other individuals overlapped with the 
norms of state relationships.”156 
The Court quoted Vattel, Kent, Blackstone, and Ware v. Hylton157 for the 
proposition that the law of nations regulates state to state interaction and as 
such is governed by “the executive and legislative domains, not the 
judicial.”158  By contrast, Justice Souter allowed that the Judiciary governed 
the second category and defined it “as a body of judge-made law regulating the 
conduct of individuals situated outside domestic boundaries and consequently 
 
 149. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671–2680 (2000). 
 150. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698. 
 151. Id. at 699. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  Since this note focuses on the ATS, there will be no further discussion of the FTCA 
claim. The Court found that Alvarez had no claim based on either statute.  See id. 
 154. Id. at 712, 714. 
 155. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712. 
 156. Id. at 714–15. 
 157. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
 158. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714. 
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carrying an international savor.”159  Once again relying on Blackstone and 
cases such as The Paquette Habana,160 the Court narrowed this category of the 
law of nations to “mercantile questions,” noting that the area gradually grew 
into international law.161  Finally, Justice Souter concluded that the drafters of 
the ATS “probably” were thinking of the three offenses delineated by 
Blackstone: “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy.”162  These types of offenses were especially 
important because “[a]n assault against an ambassador, for example, impinged 
upon the sovereignty of the foreign nation and if not adequately redressed 
could rise to an issue of war.”163 
Seeking further clarification of the law of nations, the Court next turned to 
the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention, finding “a 
distinctly American preoccupation with these hybrid international norms.”164  
The United States was preoccupied with finding a mechanism to bind the states 
to international agreements and to “vindicate rights under the law of nations,” 
including violations of treaties and offenses against ambassadors.165  Although 
it was clear to Justice Souter that the United States sought a way to bind the 
states under international law and to punish infractions against ambassadors, 
the jurisdictional question remained: “There is no record of congressional 
discussion about private actions that might be subject to the jurisdictional 
provision, or about any need for further legislation to create private remedies; 
there is no record even of debate on the section.”166  Given the lack of 
historical record on the jurisdictional question, the Court looked to modern 
scholarly articles for guidance,167 finally concluding that “it is fair to say that a 
consensus understanding of what Congress intended has proven elusive.”168 
b. Two Important Conclusions 
The Court gleaned two propositions from its historical and academic 
research.  First: 
[T]he First Congress did not pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be 
placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state legislature that might, 
 
 159. Id. at 715. 
 160. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
 161. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 715–17. 
 165. Id. at 716. 
 166. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718. 
 167. Id. at 718–19. 
 168. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
266 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:247 
someday, authorize the creation of causes of action or itself decide to make 
some element of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of foreigners.169 
And second, “Congress intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively 
modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations.”170 
Justice Souter wrote that the First Congress and drafters of the ATS 
recognized some offenses against the law of nations as being expressly 
criminal.171  Because of this, the Court concluded that it was unlikely for the 
ATS to be limited to a jurisdictional statute.172  Instead, the Court claimed it 
was likely that the First Congress would have allowed allegations of violations 
of the law of nations made by aliens to move forward without any further 
action by the Congress.173 
On the second issue, Justice Souter again turned to Blackstone in search of 
principles of the law of nations: “‘[O]ffences against this law [of nations] are 
principally incident to whole states or nations,’ and not individuals . . . .”174  
This is an important quote for the Court and a problematic one for ATS 
litigation because if ATS litigation is limited to only state actors, PMCs could 
not be held accountable.  However, defining the law of nations as that law 
which governs states or nations and not individuals represents a severely 
limited reading of Blackstone’s Commentaries.  In fact, it even ignores the 
Court’s own earlier analysis of the same text.175 
Importantly, the Court eventually concluded that private remedies were 
necessary for certain offenses against the law of nations.176  These common 
law offenses come from the law of nations,177 but they do not necessarily 
involve whole states.  Justice Souter concluded: 
[T]he First Congress understood that the district courts would recognize 
private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations, 
though we have found no basis to suspect Congress had any examples in mind 
beyond those torts corresponding to Blackstone’s three primary offenses: 
violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and 
piracy.178 
 
 169. Id. at 719. 
 170. Id. at 720. 
 171. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 720 (alteration in original) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 
*68). 
 175. See id. at 714–15. 
 176. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. 
 177. Id. at 720–22. 
 178. Id. at 724. 
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Limiting the number of torts to the three that Blackstone placed among the 
“principal offenses,” however, is questionable: “Blackstone lists these 
violations as ‘principal offenses,’ implying the list is non-exclusive; at no point 
does he suggest otherwise.”179  Further, violations such as “the plunder of a 
colony in Sierra Leone,” as noted by Attorney General Bradford, do not fit 
neatly into the three categories the Court emphasized.180 
c. Bridging the Gap Between 1790 and Today 
In order to bridge the gap between its historical understanding of the law of 
nations and the present day, the Court declared that “courts should require any 
claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have 
recognized.”181  Implicit in this statement is a restriction on the use of the ATS.  
In fact, Justice Souter’s opinion cited a series of reasons calling for “judicial 
caution,” including the following: (1) “the prevailing conception of the 
common law has changed since 1789”;182 (2) the role of the federal courts have 
changed in making common law since Erie;183 (3) the creation of a private 
right of action is a legislative decision;184 (4) new private causes of action for 
violations of international law might have serious implications for foreign 
relations;185 and (5) the Judiciary has “no congressional mandate to seek out 
and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations, and . . . 
congressional understanding of the judicial role in the field ha[s] not 
affirmatively encouraged greater judicial creativity.”186 
In spite of these arguments against the adaptation of the modern day law of 
nations to private rights, and over the objections of the U.S. government and 
Justice Scalia, the Court left open the possibility for “further independent 
judicial recognition of actionable international norms.”187  The Court asserted: 
“[J]udicial power should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still 
ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of 
international norms today.”188  Here, the Court attempted to balance its concern 
 
 179. Aaron E. Garfield, Note, Bridging a Gap in Human Rights Law: Prisoner of War Abuse 
as “War Tort,” 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 725, 737–38 (2006) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 
COMMENTARIES *68). 
 180. Id. at 738. 
 181. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 726 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). 
 184. Id. at 727. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728. 
 187. Id. at 729. 
 188. Id. 
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for the role of the Executive and the Legislative Branches with that of the 
Judiciary.  Acknowledging that Erie limited “judicial recognition of new 
substantive rules” did not mean that Erie barred the recognition of new 
substantive rules.189  Acknowledging that the Executive has an important role 
in foreign affairs did not change the fact that “[f]or two centuries we have 
affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of 
nations.”190  Justice Souter concluded that the Judiciary ought to be free to 
consider certain violations of the law of nations today, reasoning that “[i]t 
would take some explaining to say now that federal courts must avert their 
gaze entirely from any international norm intended to protect individuals.”191 
The Court pointed to the First Congress as well as later Congresses to 
support its conclusion that the Judiciary is free to consider international 
norms.192  Justice Souter’s opinion theorized that the First Congress would not 
have expected federal courts “to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable 
international norms simply because the common law might lose some 
metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism.”193  In addition, the Court 
claimed that later Congresses supported the arguments in Filartiga and Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic194 when Congress passed the Torture Victim 
Protection Act (TVPA).195  The TVPA included a reference to the ATS 
suggesting that it “should ‘remain intact to permit suits based on other norms 
that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary 
international law.’”196  In fact, Congress “expressly ratified” and carried forth 
the Court’s holding in Filartiga that “United States courts have jurisdiction 
over suits by aliens alleging torture under color of law.”197  William Casto198 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id.  The Court cites a series of cases supporting this proposition: 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423, 84 S.Ct. 923 (“[I]t is, of course, true that United States courts 
apply international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances”); The Paquette 
Habana, 175 U.S., at 700, 20 S.Ct. 290 (“International law is part of our law, and must be 
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often 
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination”); The 
Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 423, 3 L.Ed. 769 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[T]he Court is bound 
by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land”). 
Id. at 729–30. 
 191. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730. 
 192. Id. at 730–31. 
 193. Id. at 730. 
 194. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 195. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730–31 (citing Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)). 
 196. Id. at 728 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4 (1991)). 
 197. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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commented on Congress’s reaction to the Court’s decision in Filartiga by 
noting that “[i]n enacting the TVPA, Congress approved, codified, and 
elaborated upon this new tort remedy.  Rather than rejecting Filartiga, the 
Congress in effect endorsed Filartiga’s common law remedy by codifying 
it.”199  Further, the court in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.200 stated: 
The TVPA thus recognizes explicitly what was perhaps implicit in the Act of 
1789—that the law of nations is incorporated into the law of the United States 
and that a violation of the international law of human rights is (at least with 
regard to torture) ipso facto a violation of U.S. domestic law.201 
In sum, despite the fact that it ruled against Alvarez, the Court held “that 
ATS litigation is based upon a federal common law cause of action and 
involves judicial lawmaking” and “that creating the cause of action involves 
judicial discretion.”202  What remains to be determined by the courts after Sosa 
is which norms of international law, other than torture, rise to standards of 
specificity equivalent to the violation of safe conducts, infringement of the 
rights of ambassadors, and piracy.  Related to that question, as Sosa’s footnote 
twenty indicated, future courts will have to determine “whether international 
law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the 
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation 
or individual.”203 
Unfortunately, these are perhaps the most important questions with respect 
to future contractor litigation under the ATS.  Further, in the Titan cases, 
discussed in the next section, when the Supreme Court failed to answer the 
questions it raised in footnote twenty, it “closed the door” on some ATS 
litigation because it left open the possibility that: (1) PMCs and other private 
actors could not be liable for violations of the law of nations; and (2) that even 
if PMCs were found to be state actors, they would be immune from suit.204 
 
 198. Casto authored an important article cited by the Court in Sosa: William R. Casto, The 
Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 
18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986). 
 199. William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of 
International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 638 (2006). 
 200. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 201. Id. at 105. 
 202. Casto, supra note 199, at 638. 
 203. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004). 
 204. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57–58 (D.D.C. 2006); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 
391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14 & n.3 (D.D.C. 2005). 
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B. The ATS After Sosa: The Titan Cases and the Problem of the State Actor 
Requirement 
Ibrahim v. Titan Corp.205 and Saleh v. Titan Corp.206 are two contractor 
cases that illustrate the problems that the Court’s decision in Sosa created for 
ATS litigation with respect to the state actor requirement.  Although the 
Court’s decision in Sosa left the “door ajar” on the viability of the ATS, the 
Titan cases have sought to slam it shut. 
In Ibrahim, plaintiffs were Iraqi national detainees and the spouses of dead 
detainees who brought action against private government contractors.207  The 
PMCs, Titan and CACI, provided interrogators and interpreters to the United 
States.208  Plaintiffs’ claims were brought under the ATS and alleged torture.209  
Defendants claimed most prominently that “‘the law of nations’ under the 
[ATS] does not cover torture by non-state actors.”210 
The court acknowledged that treaties, as well as other sources of 
international law, strongly condemned torture.211  However, Judge Robertson 
noted that international law prohibited only “official (state) torture.”212  Here, 
he declared, the issue was “whether the law of nations applies to private 
actors” such as the PMCs in this case.213  Judge Robertson looked to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa for guidance on the issue.214  The court 
 
 205. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d 10. 
 206. Saleh, 436 F. Supp. 2d 55. 
 207. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 12. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 12–13. 
Plaintiffs’ allegations are broad and serious.  They assert that defendants and/or their 
agents tortured one or more of them by: beating them; depriving them of food and water; 
subjecting them to long periods of excessive noise; forcing them to be naked for 
prolonged periods; holding a pistol (which turned out to be unloaded) to the head of one 
of them and pulling the trigger; threatening to attack them with dogs; exposing them to 
cold for prolonged periods; urinating on them; depriving them of sleep; making them 
listen to loud music; photographing them while naked; forcing them to witness the abuse 
of other prisoners, including rape, sexual abuse, beatings and attacks by dogs; gouging out 
an eye; breaking a leg; electrocuting one of them; spearing one of them; forcing one of 
them to wear women’s underwear over his head; having women soldiers order one of 
them to take off his clothes and then beating him when he refused to do so; forbidding one 
of them to pray, withholding food during Ramadan, and otherwise ridiculing and 
mistreating him for his religious beliefs; and falsely telling one of them that his family 
members had been killed. 
Id. 
 210. Id. at 13. 
 211. Id. at 14. 
 212. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 14. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 13–14. 
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found that “[t]he Supreme Court has not answered” the question of whether the 
law of nations applies to private actors.215 
Finding no answer from the Supreme Court, the court looked to the D.C. 
Circuit and found that the law of nations did not apply to PMCs or any other 
private actors.216  In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, the court unanimously 
dismissed a case brought under the ATS alleging violations of the law of 
nations by private actors in a terrorist attack.217  Of the three judges to write an 
opinion, Judge Edwards gave most credence to the idea that private actors 
could be held accountable for violations of the law of nations under the 
ATS.218  However, Edwards could find “no consensus that private actors are 
bound by the law of nations.”219  In spite of this, Judge Edwards found there 
were “a limited number of exceptions to this principle”220 and “that torture by 
private parties acting under ‘color of law,’ as compared to torture by private 
parties ‘acting separate from any states [sic] authority or direction,’ would be 
actionable under the ATS.”221 
Judge Robertson responded to Judge Edwards’s suggestion that PMCs 
such as Titan could be held liable under the ATS if they acted under color of 
law by foreclosing that option through sovereign immunity.222  The court 
stated that “[f]or rather obvious reasons” the plaintiffs do not claim that Titan 
or CACI were state actors because “if defendants were acting as agents of the 
state, they would have sovereign immunity.”223  The court noted that while the 
plaintiffs originally submitted a memo asserting that Titan was acting under 
color of law, they withdrew that memo at a later date.224  For Judge Robertson, 
the withdrawal eliminated the need to continue the inquiry.225 
In Saleh, Judge Robertson again addressed the issue of whether PMCs 
could be held liable for violations of the law of nations under the ATS.226  
Here, the plaintiffs suggested that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sosa 
provided guidance on the issue and that the court in Ibrahim had not given it 
enough weight.227  The argument claimed that Sosa “approved Judge 
Edwards’s view in Tel-Oren that torture by private parties would be actionable 
 
 215. Id. at 14. 
 216. Id. 
 217. 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 218. See id. at 791–95. 
 219. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 14. 
 220. Id. at 14 n.2. 
 221. Id. at 14 n.3 (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 793 (Edwards, J., concurring)). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 14 n.3. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 227. Id. 
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under the ATS if the private parties were acting under color of law.”228  Judge 
Robertson rejected that argument, stating that Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan229 
controlled and that “Sosa did not overrule that precedent.”230  Further, the court 
rejected the argument that Titan was acting under color of law because the 
theory was not advanced by the plaintiffs’ assertions.231  However, Judge 
Robertson admitted “that participation in a conspiracy with government actors 
does not confer government immunities.”232 
In sum, the court’s decisions in the Titan cases turned on the problematic 
analysis of both the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedent.  In Sosa, the 
Court left unanswered the question of whether the law of nations applied to 
PMCs; in Tel-Oren, the court asserted that torture by a non-state actor was not 
a violation of the law of nations and that private actors could not be held liable 
under the ATS.233  The effect of both decisions seems to be that violations of 
the law of nations under the ATS are limited to state actors, and thus, the ATS 
does not apply to PMCs. 
Accordingly, torture is not a violation of the law of nations, but official 
torture is.  One recent article put it this way: “The law of nations may not care 
about Tony Soprano [torturing people], but it does care if Denmark is torturing 
people.”234  This view problematically creates a situation where a PMC could 
torture for governments without liability, so long as it is not a state actor.235  
Further, even if a contractor were assessed to be a state actor, Judge Robertson 
has stated that the PMC would be afforded sovereign immunity.236 
The Titan cases compounded Sosa’s failure to address the question of 
PMC liability under the ATS and raised important questions regarding ATS 
litigation.  First, is it true that the law of nations as envisioned by the writers of 
the ATS would not apply to PMCs or other private actors?  Second, if a PMC 
were found to be working closely enough with a state entity to qualify as a 
state actor, is it true that the PMC would be offered sovereign immunity? 
The next section seeks to answer both questions through an analysis of 
Kadic v. Karadžić,237 42 U.S.C. § 1983,238 and some alternate interpretations of 
the ATS. 
 
 228. Id. (citation omitted). 
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 233. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791–95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
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III.  WHAT TO DO WITH THE STATE ACTOR REQUIREMENT?: LOOKING AT 
KADIC, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 JURISPRUDENCE, AND ALTERNATE INTERPRETATIONS 
OF THE ATS 
A. Kadic v. Karadžić 
Kadic v. Karadžić provided an excellent framework for addressing the 
issue of whether private actors are accountable under the ATS for violations of 
international law.  Here, victims of the Bosnian-Herzegovina conflict brought 
an action under the ATS for violations of international law against Radovan 
Karadžić, who was the President of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic 
of Srpska.239  The allegations against Karadžić as a private actor included 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.240  The appellate court 
took up the issue of whether acts committed by non-state actors violate the law 
of nations.241  Two important elements for future ATS litigation come from 
this decision: (1) the notion that private actors can be held accountable for 
violating international law; and (2) the application of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
model to determine whether a private actor has engaged in official action for 
the purposes of jurisdiction under the ATS.242 
The court held that the law of nations is not restricted to state action.243  
Rather, “certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether 
undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private 
individuals.”244  The court convincingly cited an executive branch opinion and 
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States to 
support its argument.245  The court asserted that the Executive Branch “has 
emphatically restated in this litigation its position that private persons may be 
found liable under the Alien Tort Act for acts of genocide, war crimes, and 
other violations of international humanitarian law.”246 
 
 239. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236. 
 240. Id. 
The two groups of plaintiffs asserted causes of action for genocide, rape, forced 
prostitution and impregnation, torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, 
assault and battery, sex and ethnic inequality, summary execution, and wrongful death.  
They sought compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and, in one of the 
cases, injunctive relief. 
Id. at 237. 
 241. Id. at 236. 
 242. Id. at 239, 245. 
 243. Id. at 239. 
 244. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. 
 245. Id. at 239–40 (citing Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1795) and 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1986)). 
 246. Id. 
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Perhaps more important than the Executive Branch and the Restatement 
(Third), however, is the court’s use of case law to dispute Karadžić’s 
arguments.  Citing both Filartiga and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, the 
court read those decisions as either not reaching the question of whether 
“international law violations other than torture are actionable against private 
individuals”247 or suggesting that there were certain crimes “to which the law 
of nations attributes individual responsibility.”248 
Finally, the court disputed Karadžić’s notion that Congress intended the 
state-action requirement of the TVPA to apply to the ATS.249  The court said 
that the opposite is instead the case.250  Congress explicitly left open the 
possibility that the ATS would be used for other violations: 
Claims based on torture and summary executions do not exhaust the list of 
actions that may appropriately be covered [by the Alien Tort Act].  That statute 
should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or 
may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law.251 
Thus, if appellants demonstrated that Karadžić committed the crimes they 
alleged, nothing would prevent him from being found liable under the ATS 
even if he was an individual actor.252 
After establishing that the ATS was applicable to private actors such as 
Karadžić for certain crimes, the court moved on to evaluate the liability of a 
private actor acting in concert with a foreign state under the ATS.253  In a small 
but important section, the court addressed the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 
determine whether a private actor has engaged in official action for the 
purposes of jurisdiction under the ATS.254  Under this statute, a private 
individual can be viewed as a state actor if that individual acted in concert with 
a state in carrying out an act that violates the law.255  Such an individual “acts 
under color of law within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together 
with state officials or with significant state aid.”256  The court ruled that 
appellants should have the chance to demonstrate whether Karadžić acted 
 
 247. Id. at 240. 
 248. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 
F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)). 
 249. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241. 
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 254. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245. 
 255. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)). 
 256. Id. 
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under color of law in terms of his interaction with Yugoslavia without further 
explanation of its use of § 1983.257 
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Jurisprudence and Sovereign Immunity for PMCs 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
For our purposes, it is important to examine § 1983 jurisprudence in light 
of Kadic to determine its possible application to PMCs.  According to a recent 
article on corporate liability under the ATS, there are four tests to determine 
“when state and private involvement in a wrongful activity are so conflated 
that each actor is properly considered a state actor under § 1983.”258  The four 
tests to determine whether there is state action are as follows: (1) “a private 
party partakes in a public function or enjoys powers traditionally . . . reserved 
to the State”; (2) “state compulsion obliges the private party to commit the 
wrongful act”; (3) the nexus between the state and the private actions is such 
that they are conflated with one another; and (4) the “joint action” test.259 
According to the article, the Supreme Court acknowledges that 
“distinctions among these approaches are not always clear.”260  Despite this 
confusion, however, § 1983 jurisprudence provides the basis for an answer to 
the Supreme Court’s question in Sosa’s footnote twenty about whether courts 
can hold individual private actors and companies accountable for violations of 
a given norm.  Individual private actors or companies can be subject to 
litigation under the ATS for the violation of a given norm if they are found to 
be de facto state actors under § 1983 jurisprudence.261 
The last section of the article applies the principles of § 1983 
jurisprudence262 to Doe v. Unocal Corp.263  In Unocal, the plaintiffs brought 
suit under the ATS for offenses committed by the Burmese government on 
behalf of Unocal ranging from rape to slavery during the building of a natural 
gas pipeline.264  Before declaring that the plaintiffs’ claim against Unocal 
proposing slavery as one of the international law offenses that provides 
individual liability failed, the court analyzed whether Unocal was operating 
 
 257. Id. 
 258. Craig Forcese, ATCA’s Achilles Heel: Corporate Complicity, International Law and the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 487, 502 (2001). 
 259. Id. (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). 
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 261. Id. at 498–99. 
 262. Id. at 510–15. 
 263. 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Doe I v. 
Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g granted en banc, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), 
appeal dismissed per stipulation sub nom. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 264. Id. at 1297–98, 1303. 
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under color of law using § 1983 principles.265  The court held that “claims that 
Unocal acted under ‘color of law’ for purposes of the ATCA fail as a matter of 
law.”266  Some scholars claimed the court got it wrong in Unocal because it 
misapplied the joint action test267 and failed to consider the nexus approach in 
its discussion of color of law.268 
In spite of the district court’s final decision in Unocal, at least two of the 
four tests for determining whether a private actor can be held liable as a state 
actor seemingly apply to PMCs.  PMCs are private actors that arguably partake 
in a public function or enjoy powers that are traditionally reserved to the state, 
and the nexus between PMCs and state action is such that they are conflated. 
PMCs fight battles with U.S. military forces on the ground, serve in CIA 
paramilitary units, “maintain[] combat equipment, provide[] logistical 
support,” and fly on joint surveillance.269  PMCs operate unmanned 
surveillance planes and participate with the CIA in the hunt for Osama bin 
Laden.270  Reliance on PMCs for work that the state would normally do is such 
that when Halliburton officials threatened to leave Iraq because of security 
concerns, a Pentagon official stated that Halliburton’s withdrawal would result 
in a “complete collapse of the support infrastructure” for the CPA.271 
Further, PMCs are routinely conflated with U.S. soldiers in Iraq.272  Even 
U.S. military officials admit that PMCs damage the mission in Iraq when they 
mistreat, wound, rape, and kill Iraqis.273  This is so because Iraqis believe that 
PMCs are U.S. military.274  PMCs “defended the CPA headquarters in Najaf 
from being overrun by radical Shiite militia.”275  Blackwater resupplied the 
military with ammunition and “ferr[ied] out a wounded marine.”276  At Abu 
Ghraib, members of the military admitted that they were not certain who was 
in charge,277 likely leading to confusion about which protocols were being 
followed and how to discipline those who were outside of that protocol. 
In sum, if § 1983 principles were applied to PMCs, they could easily be 
considered state actors under both the public function/powers traditionally 
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reserved to the state test and the nexus/conflation test.  However, if the PMC is 
a state actor and its offenses do not reach a level of war crimes such that it is 
open to prosecution under international law, would the PMC be afforded 
sovereign immunity?  According to the Titan cases, that would be so.  Judge 
Robertson asserted that plaintiffs were careful not to claim that defendants 
were state actors because “they would have sovereign immunity under 
Sanchez-Espinoza.”278 
2. Immunity 
The court’s holding in the Titan cases is subject to scrutiny because of 
similar cases involving government contractors in the prison system and the 
immigration system.  In Richardson v. McKnight,279 the plaintiff sued 
government contractors working in a state prison, and the Court declared that 
while prison officials were protected by qualified immunity, government 
contractors were not.280  Similarly, in Jama v. INS,281 where plaintiffs sued 
both Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials and government 
contractors working for the INS, the court suggested that while INS officials 
sued in their official capacities were protected by sovereign immunity, 
government contractors were not.282 
In Richardson, an inmate brought a § 1983 claim against two private 
contractor prison guards, alleging that the restraints the guards used caused 
serious injury.283  The defendants argued that they were entitled to qualified 
immunity from prosecution.284  The Supreme Court ruled that the guards were 
not entitled to qualified immunity because neither the history nor the purpose 
of immunity supported extending it to private prison guards.285 
In Jama, undocumented aliens were detained, pending determination of 
their asylum status, at an INS facility run by a private contractor.286  The 
plaintiffs asserted claims under the ATS inter alia against five categories of 
defendants: (1) Esmor (the private contractor corporation); (2) Esmor officers; 
(3) Esmor Guards; (4) the INS; and (5) INS officials.287  The court stated that 
while the INS and its officials (sued in their official capacities) were protected 
by sovereign immunity, the private contractor as a corporate entity and its 
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officers were not.288  The court reasoned that sovereign immunity attached 
only to government officials, because only they have an official capacity.289 
C. Alternate Interpretations of the ATS: State Actor Not Required 
Perhaps the most obvious way of maneuvering around the state actor 
requirement would be to reevaluate the Supreme Court’s analysis of the issue.  
According to recent scholarship, “[t]he question is not whether the ATS can be 
applied against private actors, but why should it be applied to anything but 
private actors.”290  For example, private actors would have been most likely to 
violate the three norms Sosa associated with the ATS.291  A closer look at 
piracy, violation of safe conducts, and offenses against ambassadors—the 
norms agreed to by the Supreme Court after an analysis of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries—suggests that it would have been difficult for a state to have 
ever committed these violations of the law of nations.292  Pirates are generally 
not state actors, although it is clear that piracy violated the law of nations.293  
An individual American citizen who punched an ambassador in the street in 
1790 would not have to act on behalf of the state in order for his attack to 
violate the law of nations. 
While the violation of safe conducts seems at first to be the one act that 
required a state actor, recent scholarship has suggested that the safe conducts 
branch of the trilogy of law of nations violations under the ATS is the most 
expansive.294  Under the “safe conduct theory” of the ATS, the statute seeks to 
provide “redress of torts against aliens that the United States had a 
commitment under international law to protect.”295  Thus, “[c]laims for torture 
and maltreatment by increasing numbers of private U.S. and alien 
contractors—at Abu Ghraib, at Guantanamo Bay, and at immigration facilities 
in the United States—are heartland ATS claims, regardless of whether the 
tortfeasors are U.S. citizens, alien contractors, or corporations.”296  From this 
view of the ATS, the United States owes a duty to aliens in areas where the 
government has assumed responsibility or where the presence of U.S. troops 
gives the impression of responsibility.  Under this reading, the United States 
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violates the paradigm of the eighteenth century understanding of the law of 
nations by allowing Titan, Blackwater, or DynCorp to get away with, condone, 
or otherwise turn a blind eye to torture and murder.  Accordingly, then, the 
ATS in the eighteenth century would have required no state action. 
CONCLUSION 
The upswing in the privatization of the military under the Bush 
Administration and the heavy reliance on PMCs have created problems that the 
U.S. government was not prepared to handle.  From torture at Abu Ghraib to 
the murder of innocent civilians just outside of the Green Zone in Iraq, PMCs 
have been on the front pages of the world newspapers, leaving the rest of the 
world with the impression that the United States is a lawless nation.  Failure at 
all levels of government to address fully the problems of PMC oversight and 
accountability has reinforced that notion. 
Whether a failure of drafting, as in the first two incarnations of MEJA, or a 
failure of will to enforce the law, the tools of criminal law have failed to 
address adequately the problems PMCs have created.  While the ATS is by no 
means the perfect vessel through which regulation of PMCs can be 
accomplished, the ATS offers a means for aliens to redress the injuries they 
suffered at the hands of PMCs abroad.  It is crucial that these victims be 
afforded their day in court and that our system evaluates their claims fairly in 
order for the United States to live up to the high ideals on which its founding 
was based.  As such, the ATS, a product of the founding generation, can serve 
as one of the most important mechanisms to regaining the high ground. 
Whether the courts follow modern scholarly analysis and recognize that 
PMCs are liable for violations of the law of nations under the ATS because 
there is properly no state actor requirement or they apply the principles of 
§ 1983 jurisprudence to PMCs and establish that PMCs are state actors because 
of a nexus between them and the state, the result is the same.  By offering 
aliens the use of our federal courts to pursue their claims for violations of the 
law of nations, the United States can fulfill one of the principal purposes 
behind the ATS, which is to instill confidence in foreign nations that the 
United States of America will honor its international obligations and be a 
trustworthy partner in the future. 
POSTSCRIPT 
On December 8, 2008, the Justice Department unsealed its case against 
five Blackwater security guards for the September 16, 2007 shootings that 
killed seventeen Iraqis in Baghdad’s Nisour Square.297  A sixth guard, Jeremy 
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Ridgeway, pled guilty to manslaughter, describing “how he and the other 
guards used automatic rifles and grenade launchers to fire on cars, houses, a 
traffic officer and a girls’ school.”298  The five other guards rejected 
Ridgeway’s claims but surrendered to federal authorities in Utah, believing 
they will face a more sympathetic, conservative jury.299  Prosecutors plan to 
argue that MEJA300 provides jurisdiction for “filing charges against the guards, 
who were hired by the State Department, not the Department of Defense.”301 
Although the Justice Department has filed no charges stemming from the 
killings against Blackwater itself, Iraq’s government refused to grant the PMC 
a license to operate.302  Further, the Iraqi government focused on Blackwater 
and the legal status of security contractors in general as a “central issue in the 
negotiations over the status-of-forces agreement.”303 During these negotiations, 
Iraqi representatives eliminated the previously existing immunity granted to 
PMCs304 under Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority. 
While it is promising that the Justice Department has followed through and 
brought charges against these Blackwater guards under MEJA, the ATS still 
has an important role to play.  For example, in Saleh v. Titan Corp., an action 
brought under the ATS, 250 Iraqi citizens used the U.S. courts to pursue claims 
of torture, rape, and war crimes, among other violations of international law.305  
Although the ATS portion of the lawsuit has been dismissed, plaintiffs are 
appealing that ruling in federal court.306  Finally, in Atban v. Blackwater, 
plaintiffs are those injured or the families of those murdered on September 16, 
2007 in Nisour Square.307  They are suing Blackwater itself, not simply the 
individual employees, under the ATS in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia.308 
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